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Abstract We adapt the classical core concept to deal with situations involving time
and uncertainty. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that
are stable against coalitional deviations ex ante, and moreover cannot be improved
upon by any coalition after the resolution of uncertainty. We restrict ourselves to
credible deviations, where a coalitional deviation cannot be counterblocked by
some subcoalition. We study the relationship of the resulting core concept with
other sequential core concepts, give sufficient conditions under which the weak
sequential core is non-empty, but show that it is possible to give reasonable exam-
ples where it is empty.
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1 Introduction
One of the central questions in the theory on resource allocation is which distributions
are to be regarded as self-enforcing, or stable. There seems to exist a large consen-
sus on a necessary condition for stable allocations, namely that no coalition should
be able to improve upon it by gathering and redistributing its resources among the
coalition members. The latter property is referred to as the core condition. While
this property may have an unambiguous meaning in purely static contexts, it is not
obvious, a-priori, how to formalize the principle in a framework, where there is
initial uncertainty about some parameters of the economy, to be released at later
stages, but where contracting at the initial state is incomplete. In fact, it is not as
much the core property as the notion of feasibility that is ambiguous when renego-
tiation is allowed ex post. The reason is that, when a coalition considers to block a
given allocation ex ante, it has to form expectations on feasible allocations at later
stages.
It is thus necessary to extend the “classical” core concept to the framework
mentioned above, requiring an allocation not only to be stable at the beginning,
but in addition to remain stable against possible deviations after the resolution of
uncertainty, or once the dynamic cooperation process is under way. Such sequen-
tial core concepts have been investigated by Gale (1978), Becker and Chakrabarti
(1995), Repullo (1988), and Koutsougeras (1998) for specific economic environ-
ments, whereas Kranich et al. (2005) propose two core concepts for situations where
agents face a finite sequence of transferable utility games: the strong sequential
core and the weak sequential core.
Predtetchinski et al. (2002) apply an appropriately adapted version of the strong
sequential core to two-stage economies in which trade in assets takes place at period
zero and trade in commodities at period one. The payoff to each asset is uncertain
at period zero, but is revealed before trade in commodities takes place. At period
0, only the contracts related to assets are binding. The idea in the strong sequential
core concept is to select those state contingent allocations which are stable against
coalitional deviations ex ante, and moreover cannot be improved upon by any
coalition after the resolution of uncertainty. It may be the case, however, that the
deviation by a coalition that promised improvement in ex ante terms, can in turn be
improved upon by some sub-coalition once the true state is known. In this case, it
could be argued that the coalitional deviation at hand is not “credible” since it may
be counterblocked by some subcoalition. By imposing the weaker restriction that
state contingent allocations should be robust solely against “credible” deviations,
the concept of the weak sequential core is obtained, which is the subject of study
in this paper.
The economic model under consideration resembles the set-up used in the lit-
erature on the core in economies with asymmetric information. For an excellent
survey of that literature, see Forges et al. (2002). In both streams of the literature,
one may consider an ex ante stage, before information is released, an interim stage,
when individuals receive a private signal, and an ex post stage, when all private
signals are available. In the special case considered in this paper, information is
symmetric, and so the interim stage and the ex post stage coincide. The important
distinction between this paper and the asymmetric information literature is that
here only a (potentially) limited set of contracts, specified at the outset, is binding
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in the ex ante stage. In contrast, all incentive compatible contracts are binding in
the asymmetric information literature. In our symmetric information set-up, this
would correspond to the case where all possible state-contingent contracts are bind-
ing ex ante, and the weak sequential core would correspond to the classical core.
When only a limited set of binding contracts is available ex ante, there is scope for
renegotiation in the interim stage.
For static cooperative situations, it is known that the restriction to credible devi-
ations by coalitions does not alter the definition of the core: an allocation can be
blocked by some coalitional deviation if and only if it can be blocked by a credible
coalitional deviation (see Ray 1989). Kranich et al. (2005) show, however, that this
restriction becomes relevant if one turns to dynamic cooperative environments.
Consequently, the weak sequential core for such economies is in general a strict
superset of the strong sequential core.
The concept of the two-stage core, due to Koutsougeras (1998), is obtained
under the assumption that if a deviation occurs before the true state is known,
no exchange can take place within the deviating coalition once the state has been
revealed. Members of the deviating coalition have completely pessimistic expec-
tations concerning re-trading opportunities. In the weak sequential core, members
of the deviating coalition will instead hold the more optimistic expectations that
they are able to coordinate on a specific ex post core element. Under a number of
weak conditions, the weak sequential core is a subset of the two-stage core.
In Predtetchinski et al. (2002) it is shown that the strong sequential core is
empty for a large family of economies. In contrast, the weak sequential core will
be shown to be non-empty in a number of important special cases. One instance is
a finance economy, where the weak sequential core coincides with the two-stage
core. Another is when a complete set of state-contingent contracts is available for
trade. Then the weak sequential core, the strong sequential core, and the two-stage
core coincide. Finally, we prove that the weak sequential core is non-empty for
economies with two agents.
Surprisingly, we give an example with three agents and no assets where the
weak sequential core is empty. While the strong sequential core has been shown to
be weakly increasing in the number of assets, the comparative statics of the weak
sequential core are more complicated: it may be non-empty in an economy with
no assets, and become empty after introducing a single asset in the economy as we
show by means of an example.
2 The model
We consider an economy with two periods of time referred to as t = 0 and t = 1,
and a finite set S = {1, . . . , S} of possible states in period t = 1. The probability
ρs > 0 of realization of state s ∈ S is objectively known.
There is a finite set N of agents. Agents trade in J assets in period t = 0 and,
conditional on the realization of the state, in L commodities in period t = 1. In
state s ∈ S, agent i ∈ N has a consumption set Xis ⊂ RL. The ex-ante consump-
tion set of agent i is given by Xi = ×s∈SXis . Each agent i is further characterized
by his vector ωis ∈ Xis of endowments in state s ∈ S and his elementary utility
function uis : X
i
s → R. Agents are expected-utility maximizers, with vi : Xi → R
the expected utility function defined by vi(xi) = ∑s∈S ρsuis(xis).
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We let A denote the SL × J matrix of asset payoffs. Generic entry Ajsl of A
specifies the quantity of commodity l paid by asset j in state s ∈ S.
Thus, an economy is a tuple
E = 〈N, S, J, L, A, (ρs, Xis, ωis, uis)i∈Ns∈S〉.
Let E be the class of all economies. The institutional set-up is as follows.
1. In period t = 0, trade in assets takes place.Alternatively, one may think of these
trades taking the form of state-contingent contracts. There is no endowment
and therefore no consumption in period t = 0.
2. Nature randomly chooses the state. The execution of asset contracts takes place
and results in an allocation x.
3. In period t = 1, trade in commodities takes place. Agents treat allocation x as
their endowments. Trade in commodities results in a final allocation y.
Notice that the institutional setting is one of dynamic exchange without prices.
Our analysis is therefore complementary to the extensive literature on constrained
suboptimality of competitive equilibria when asset markets are incomplete (see for
instance Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 1986).
For E ∈ E and a coalition M ⊆ N of agents, let A(M, E) be the set of
A-feasible allocations for M , i.e. the allocations that can be achieved by trade in












i = ∑i∈M ωi,
xi − ωi ∈ 〈A〉 for all i ∈ M
}
,
where 〈A〉 denotes the linear space spanned by the columns of A. If there are no





For E ∈ E, M ⊆ N , an A-feasible allocation x ∈ A(M, E), and a state s ∈ S,
we define an ex post sub-economy rs(x, M, E) as an economy following the real-
ization of the state s and involving only the participants of coalition M . In this
economy the set of agents is M , the number of commodities is L, the consump-
tion set of agent i ∈ M is Xis , the utility function is uis , and the endowment is xis .
Formally,
rs(x, M, E) = 〈M, L, (ρs, Xis, xis , uis)i∈M〉.


























s) for all i ∈ Q.
3 Three concepts of the sequential core
In this section we compare the concept of the weak sequential core to that of the
strong sequential core and that of the two-stage core.
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Definition 1 An allocation ȳ is an element of the weak sequential core of the
economy E = (N, S, J, L, A, 〈ρs, Xis, ωis, uis〉i∈Ns∈S), denoted WSC(E), if
1. there exists x̄ ∈ A(N, E) such that ȳs ∈ C(rs(x̄, N, E)) for all s ∈ S,
2. there do not exist M ⊆ N , y ∈ ×i∈MXi , and x ∈ A(M, E) such that ys ∈
C(rs(x, M, E)) for all s ∈ S and vi(yi) > vi(ȳi) for all i ∈ M .
Part 1 is the requirement that ȳ be robust against potential deviations at t = 1, after
the true state has been revealed. Part 2 is the requirement that ȳ be robust against
all credible deviations at t = 0, before the true state is known.
The three sequential core concepts – the weak sequential core, the strong
sequential core, and the two-stage core – agree on the meaning of improvement by
a coalition at t = 1. Since agents face no uncertainty and no prospects of future
consumption at t = 1, the classical definition of an improving coalition seems
to be appropriate, with the initial positions of coalitions being determined by the
allocation x̄. This results in the requirement that ȳs ∈ C(rs(x̄, N, E)) for all s ∈ S.
The situation differs as we turn to t = 0. It is not obvious which deviations
should be taken into account, and which not. Whence a discrepancy between the
three sequential core concepts as to the definition of an improvement by a coalition
at t = 0. The idea in the weak sequential core is to focus on credible deviations.
Suppose that a coalition M considers to deviate at t = 0 to allocation y, which
is preferred, in expected terms, to allocation ȳ by all of its members. In general,
there may be counter-deviations from y by sub-coalitions of M at t = 1. Coalition
M , however, might redistribute assets among its members at t = 0 in such a way
that, given this redistribution, no deviations from y will be profitable at t = 1. If
there does exist such a redistribution, then y can be regarded as a credible deviation.
Otherwise it is not credible, for there may be counter-deviations from y at t = 1.
The weak sequential core requires its elements to be robust only against credible
deviations, rather than against all possible deviations in the classical sense.
Below we reproduce the definition of the strong sequential core from Predtetchin-
ski et al. (2002).
Definition 2 An allocation ȳ is an element of the strong sequential core of the
economy E = (N, S, J, L, A, 〈ρs, Xis, ωis, uis〉i∈Ns∈S), denoted SSC(E), if
1. there exists x̄ ∈ A(N, E) such that ȳs ∈ C(rs(x̄, N, E)) for all s ∈ S,
2. there do not exist M ⊆ N and y ∈ ×i∈MXi such that
∑
i∈M y
i = ∑i∈M ωi
and vi(yi) > vi(ȳi) for all i ∈ M .
The difference between Definitions 1 and 2 is that the latter does not require devi-
ations of coalitions at t = 0 to be robust to possible counter-deviations by sub-
coalitions at t = 1. Instead, the classical notion of improvement is adopted: a
coalition improves upon ȳ with y, if y is feasible and gives each member of the
deviating coalition a higher expected utility than ȳ does. Any element of the strong
sequential core must therefore be stable against all the deviations in the classical
sense, whether credible or not. Thus, the strong sequential core is a subset of the
weak sequential core.
We proceed with the definition of the two-stage core, due to Koutsougeras
(1998).
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Definition 3 An allocation ȳ is an element of the two-stage core of the economy
E = (N, S, J, L, A, 〈ρs, Xis, ωis, uis〉i∈Ns∈S), denoted T SC(E), if
1. there exists x̄ ∈ A(N, E) such that ȳs ∈ C(rs(x̄, N, E)) for all s ∈ S,
2. there do not exist M ⊆ N and x ∈ A(M, E) such that vi(xi) > vi(ȳi) for all
i ∈ M .
Unlike Definitions 1 and 2, Definition 3 assumes that a coalition can only use
A-feasible allocations to improve at t = 0: no exchange can take place within the
deviating coalition at t = 1. The coalition that deviates at t = 0 is thus confined
in its choice of consumption bundles to those that can be achieved by means of an
exchange of assets alone.
The relationship between the three sequential core concepts is summarized in
the following observation.
Observation 1 Let E ∈ E.
1. SSC(E) ⊆ WSC(E) and SSC(E) ⊆ T SC(E).
2. Suppose that the consumption set Xis is closed, convex and bounded from below,
and the elementary utility function uis is continuous and quasi-concave for all
i ∈ N , s ∈ S. Then WSC(E) ⊆ T SC(E).
In fact, the inclusion WSC(E) ⊆ TSC(E) holds whenever C(rs(x, M, E)) = ∅
for all s ∈ S, M ⊆ N , and x ∈ A(M, E). This is guaranteed by the conditions
of the second part of Observation 1. Otherwise, it may be more difficult to deviate
according to the definition of the weak sequential core than according to the defi-
nition of the two-stage core. In this case the inclusion WSC(E) ⊆ TSC(E) may
not hold.
Proof Part 1 is obvious. To prove Part 2, let ȳ ∈ WSC(E). Suppose that ȳ /∈
T SC(E). Then there are M ⊆ N and x ∈ A(M, E) such that vi(xi) > vi(ȳi) for
all i ∈ M . The assumptions of Observation 1 guarantee that C(rs(x, M, E)) = ∅
for all s ∈ S. For s ∈ S, let ys ∈ C(rs(x, M, E)). Now, vi(yi) ≥ vi(xi) > vi(ȳi)
for all i ∈ M . This implies, however, that ȳ /∈ WSC(E) , a contradiction. We
conclude that ȳ ∈ T SC(E). 

4 Some properties of the weak sequential core
In this section we consider three special cases: the case where a complete set of
state-contingent contracts is available, the case of a finance economy, and the case
of a two-agent economy.
We start with the case where for each commodity l and each state s there is
a contract specifying the delivery of commodity l contingent on the occurrence
of state s. The total number of state-contingent contracts is therefore SL. When
all of these state-contingent contracts are available, A is the identity matrix. More
generally, we can require the span of A to be the whole space RSL. If this is indeed
the case, then any coalitional deviation in the classical sense and, in particular, any
credible coalitional deviation, can be implemented directly by an appropriate trade
in assets. Upon the realization of the state, asset contracts are executed, and no
retrading of commodities is needed. It follows that the weak sequential core and
the strong sequential core coincide with the two-stage core.
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Observation 2 Let E ∈ E. Suppose that Xis is closed and bounded from below, and
uis is continuous for all i ∈ N , s ∈ S. If 〈A〉 = RSL, then SSC(E) = WSC(E) =
T SC(E).
Proof If 〈A〉 = RSL, then SSC(E) = T SC(E), as is obvious from Definitions
2 and 3. By Observation 1, SSC(E) ⊆ WSC(E). We now prove the inclusion
SSC(E) ⊇ WSC(E).
Let ȳ ∈ WSC(E) and suppose ȳ /∈ SSC(E). Then there exists a coalitional
deviation from ȳ at t = 0 in the classical sense (see Definition 2). Let M be a
deviating coalition and y be a profitable deviation. We show that the coalition M
has a credible deviation from ȳ, thus obtaining a contradiction.





subject to zi ∈ Xi and vi(zi) ≥ vi(yi) for all i ∈ M,
∑
i∈M z
i = ∑i∈M ωi.
Under the conditions of Observation 2, the admissible set of this problem is com-
pact and the objective function is continuous. Therefore, the problem has a solution,
say z̄ ∈ ×i∈MXi . We prove that z̄s ∈ C(rs(z̄, M, E)) for all s ∈ S.



















żiσ if s = σ and i ∈ Q,
z̄is otherwise.
Then z is feasible for coalition M and vi(zi) ≥ vi(z̄i) for all i ∈ M , with strict
inequality for all i ∈ Q. This contradicts, however, the definition of z̄ as a solution
to the optimization problem above. We see that z̄s ∈ C(rs(z̄, M, E)) for all s ∈ S.
Furthermore, vi(z̄i) ≥ vi(yi) > vi(ȳi) for all i ∈ M . Thus z̄ is a credible deviation
from ȳ by M . 

Next we examine the case of a finance economy. A finance economy is a spe-
cial case of a two-period economy, where a unique commodity is available in each
s ∈ S, i.e. L = 1. If Xis = R+ and the utility functions uis are all increasing, then
for all s ∈ S, all M ⊆ N , and all x ∈ A(M, E) the set C(rs(x, M, E)) consists of
the point xs alone. This leads to the following observation.
Observation 3 Let E ∈ E. If L = 1, Xis = R+, and uis is increasing for all i ∈ N
and all s ∈ S, then WSC(E) = T SC(E).
In a finance economy with no assets, the initial allocation need not be robust against
ex ante coalitional deviations in the classical sense, in which case the strong sequen-
tial core is empty. This shows that the weak sequential core may be a strict superset
of the strong sequential core.
We summarize Observations 1–3 in Table 1. Each column of this table gives
sufficient conditions for an inclusion specified in the top row to hold. A star means
“no assumptions”.
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Table 1 The summary of results (Observations 1–3)
SSC ⊆ WSC
SSC ⊆ TSC TSC ⊆ SSC WSC ⊆ SSC WSC ⊆ TSC WSC = TSC
〈A〉 ∗ RSL RSL ∗ ∗
Xis ∗ ∗ Closed Closed L = 1, Xis = R+
bounded below bounded below
convex
uis ∗ ∗ Continuous Continuous Increasing
quasi-concave
To conclude the present section we formulate an existence result for the weak
sequential core in case of an economy with two agents. This result is in sharp
contrast with the findings on the strong sequential core. As is demonstrated in
Predtetchinski et al. (2002), the strong sequential core may be empty in an econ-
omy satisfying all assumptions of Observation 4.
Observation 4 Let E ∈ E. Suppose that the economy E satisfies the following
assumptions: the set of agents is N = {a, b}, the consumption sets Xis are closed
and bounded from below, and the elementary utility functions uis are continuous.
Then WSC(E) = ∅.

























vi(ωi) ≤ vi(yi), i ∈ N,
uis(x
i
s) ≤ uis(yis), i ∈ N, s ∈ S
}
.
Observe that (ω, ω) ∈ Z(N). Moreover, under the assumptions of Observation
4, both X(N) and A(N, E) are compact sets. It follows that Z(N) is compact as
well.
Let αa and αb be non–negative real numbers at least one of which is positive.
Let (x̄, ȳ) ∈ Z(N) be a maximizer of the function αava(ya) + αbvb(yb) over
Z(N). In the remainder of the proof we show that ȳ ∈ WSC(E).
First we show that ȳs ∈ C(rs(x̄, N, E)) for all s ∈ S. Since uis(x̄is) ≤ uis(ȳis),
neither player a nor player b is able to improve upon ȳ at t = 1. Now suppose that
the grand coalition is able to improve upon ȳ at t = 1 by deviating in some state
σ ∈ S. Then there is zσ ∈ Xσ(N) such that uiσ (ȳiσ ) < uiσ (ziσ ) for i = a, b. Define
z̄ ∈ X(N) as follows:
z̄is =
{
ziσ , if s = σ,
ȳis , otherwise.
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Then uis(ȳ
i
s) ≤ uis(z̄is) for i = a, b with strict inequality in state σ . It follows that
vi(ȳi) < vi(z̄i) for i = a, b and that (x̄, z̄) ∈ Z(N). This contradicts the definition
of (x̄, ȳ).
Now we show that the pair of allocations (x̄, ȳ) satisfies the second part of
Definition 1. Since vi(ωi) ≤ vi(ȳi), neither player can improve upon ȳ by deviat-
ing to his endowment at t = 0. Suppose that the grand coalition is able to improve
upon ȳ by deviating at t = 0. Let (x, y) denote an improving deviation, i.e. a pair
of allocations such that x ∈ A(N, E), ys ∈ C(rs(x, N, E)) for all s ∈ S, and
vi(ȳi) < vi(yi) for i = a, b. Then y is ex ante individually rational. Since ys is
individually rational in the ex post subeconomies, uis(x
i
s) ≤ uis(yis). We see that
(x, y) ∈ Z(N). This contradicts the definition of (x̄, ȳ). 

5 Examples
The purpose of the examples reported below is to demonstrate some limitations
of the concept of the weak sequential core. In Examples 1 and 2, two economies
with three agents and no assets are shown to have an empty weak sequential core.
In contrast, the economy in Example 3, also with three agents and no assets, has
a non-empty weak sequential core. It is shown, however, that the weak sequential
core becomes empty, when an appropriately specified asset is introduced into the
economy.
Example 1 Let E be an economy with two equally probable states (S = {1, 2},
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.5), two goods in each state (L = 2), a set N = {a, b, c} of agents,
and no assets (J = 0). The consumption set Xis of each agent in every state is
the non-negative orthant of the space R2. The elementary utility functions and the
endowments in state s = 1 are given by







a) = za2, ub1(zb) = zb1 + 2zb2 − 200, and uc1(zc) = zc1 + 2zc2 − 200.
In state s = 2, the utility functions and the endowments are







a) = za1 + 2za2 − 200, ub2(zb) = zb2, and uc2(zc) = zc1 + 2zc2 − 200.
We show WSC(E) = ∅. The set C(r1(ω, N, E)) consists, in utility space, of
the unique vector (50, 0, 0). This utility vector is supported by any allocation of
commodities where the entire endowment of good 1 is allocated among agents b
and c, with one unit of good 1 exchanged for half a unit of good 2, so that agent a
receives 50 units of good 2. Similarly, C(r2(ω, N, E)) consists of the utility vector
(0, 50, 0) alone. Thus, the only ex ante utility vector that can be achieved by the
grand coalition is (25, 25, 0).
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This vector is blocked by the coalition {a, b}. Indeed, in state s = 1, the vec-
tor (0, 100) belongs to C(r1(ω, {a, b}, E)). It is supported by the allocation of
commodities where the entire endowment of good 1 is allocated to agent b, while
a gets nothing. In state s = 2 the vector (100, 0) of ex post utilities belongs to
C(r2(ω, {a, b}, E)). Since the corresponding ex ante utilities are (50, 50), coalition
{a, b} has a credible deviation. Thus the weak sequential core is empty. 

It is even possible to construct an economy with empty weak sequential core
where the elementary utility functions are state-independent, strongly monotone,
and strictly concave. Below we report one example of such an economy.
Example 2 Consider an economy E with two states occurring with positive prob-
ability (S = {1, 2}), three goods in each state (L = 3), the set N = {a, b, c} of
agents and no assets (J = 0). The consumption set Xis of each agent in every state
is given by the strictly positive orthant of R3, and the state–independent elementary
utility functions are given by
uis(z
i) = ln(zi1) + ln(zi2) + ln(zi3), i ∈ N, s ∈ S.
The endowments are
















It turns out that the weak sequential core is empty whenever 0 < ε ≤ 0.021. The
proof can be found in the discussion paper by Predtetchinski et al. (2002). 

Finally, we report an example of an economy where the weak sequential core
is non-empty if no assets are present, and becomes empty when an appropriately
specified asset is introduced.
Example 3 Consider an economy E with two equally probable states (S = {1, 2},
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.5), two goods in each state (L = 2), and the set N = {a, b, c} of
agents. The consumption set Xis of each agent in every state is given by the strictly
positive orthant of R2, and the state-independent elementary utility functions are
given by
uis(z
i) = ln(zi1) + ln(zi2), i ∈ N, s ∈ S.
The endowments are
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If there are no assets, then the weak sequential core is non-empty and is given by
the set of allocations of the form (ω1, y2), where y2 ∈ C(r2(ω, N, E)). Suppose












i.e. the asset is a contract for the delivery of commodity 1 in state s = 1 . Then
WSC(E) = ∅ whenever 0 < ε ≤ 0.038. The proof can be found in the discussion
paper by Predtetchinski et al. (2002). 
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